The romantic German Herder, and Hegel himself, shared with Ramon Valls the thought
that the "we" cannot come simply from the Hobbesian fear of constant
competition nor from the mutual agonism among individual "‘I’s", but
must emerge from a natural "we" which is present on family and
community life. In fact, this is the key in the German concept of nation which
Valls always viewed with reluctance.
Certainly Ramon Valls recognized that within the human condition there is the
principle of sociability and its contrast: unsocial agonism. But he does not
see this dualism as more or less equal (as did Kant and, more optimistically,
Herder), but as a disequilibrium with a near complete domination by agonism.
For Valls this is a far more powerful principle than unsociability, so that
sociability is nearly irrelevant when confronted with the dangerous human
agonism. As a result the human condition is dual, as Kant said, and needs
sociability and community impulses, as Herder noted, but the predominance of
egotistical agonism is so great, according to Valls, that the duality or
sociability are marginal.
Therefore, in none of his analyses does Valls start from the impulse of
sociability to legitimize the "we"; but always thinks of it as a
protector (with a monopoly on violence) against the war of all against all,
which is inevitable without the resistance of the "Leviathan-we".
For
Valls it is a mistake to think of the "we" as a nation, cultural or
linguistic community, etc. This radically separated him from many of the
Catalan and Spanish nationalists of his generation. He always refused to
consider that the true "we" could be limited (which is different from
incorporating some of the secondary characteristics) to such a feeble base
which is linked to the dangerous animal human nature such as community,
cultural, linguistic, historical ... links.